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Abstract 
In this paper, we revisit the association between happiness and inequality. We argue that the perceived 
fairness of the income generation process affects this association. Building on a two-period model of 
individual life-time utility maximization, we predict that persons with higher perceived fairness will 
experience higher levels of life-time utility and are less in favor of income redistribution. In societies 
with a high level of actual social mobility, income inequality is perceived more positively with 
increased expected fairness. The opposite is expected for countries with low actual social mobility, 
due to an increasing relevance of a disappointment effect resulting from unsuccessful individual 
investments. Using the World Values Survey data and a broad set of fairness measures, we find strong 
support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for more 
equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the disappointment 
effect in low social mobility countries. In contrast, the results for high-mobility countries turn out to be 
ambiguous. 
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Inequality is undoubtedly more readily borne, and 
affects the dignity of the person much less, if it is 
determined by impersonal forces than when it is 
due to design. 
Friedrich Hayek 
(1944, 117) 
 
1. Introduction 
Since Abba Lerner’s classic contributions from the 1930s, welfare economics has argued that 
income redistribution can increase overall welfare in a society with an unequal distribution of 
incomes, due to the decreasing returns to income caused by an assumed strict concavity of 
individual utility functions (Lerner, 1944). This view implies that most people in societies 
characterized by a highly skewed income distribution should, all other things being equal, be 
observed to experience lower levels of utility. With the advent of the economics of happiness, 
it has become possible – and fashionable – to test this implication on individuals’ self-
reported life satisfaction, arguably being a reliable proxy for the economic concept of 
‘utility’.1 If Lerner’s implication – and indeed standard economic theory – is correct, we 
would expect to see a clear negative association between income inequality and life 
satisfaction of the average person. Such empirical results would be in line with the more 
recent theoretical model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), taking account of social (other-
regarding) preferences in individuals’ utility functions, equally predicting a negative relation 
between inequality and happiness.  
Even though this traditional, simple microeconomic approach predicts that overall and 
average welfare in an economy decrease with income inequality, the empirical literature on 
the association between income inequality and happiness2 has yielded ambiguous findings.3 
                                               
1
 For an overview of the economic, sociological and psychological concepts of subjective well-being and validity 
studies on its alternative measures, see Diener et al. (2008), and Veenhoven (2000).  
2
 In this paper, we use the terms ‘happiness’, ‘subjective well-being’, and ‘well-being’ interchangeably. 
3
 In a related field of research Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008) and Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2009), among 
others, use micro data to analyze income inequality effects through social comparisons where persons compare 
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One of the first empirical contributions, Alesina et al. (2004), identify a negative association 
between income inequality and happiness for 12 European countries, but an association that is 
not statistically significant for most US states. Explaining their results, the authors 
hypothesize that differences in perceived and actual social mobility exist between these two 
continents. Extending the sample to 30 OECD countries, Fischer (2009) reports a negative 
association between individual life satisfaction and inequality in final income, but not for 
market-generated income inequality – potentially indicating that it is actual consumption on 
which social comparisons are based.4 In a world sample, however, the large-scale robustness 
analysis in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) suggests that the skewness of the income 
distribution does not, in general, affect individual happiness. 
In this paper, we enrich the association between inequality and happiness with a new 
feature indicated by the quote from Hayek above: we allow individuals’ subjective 
perceptions of the ‘fairness’ of the present income generating process to affect the association 
between life satisfaction and income inequality. In the words of Hopkins (2008), we aim at 
differentiating between reward inequality (possibly caused by an unfair income generating 
process even when endowments (skills) have been equal) and endowment inequality (which 
exists prior to any market transaction, and is shown to persist even when the income 
generating process is fair). Indeed, Grosfeld and Senik (2009) show that in the transition 
country Poland, at first, income inequality contributed positively to people’s happiness from 
1992 to 1996, when it was associated with economic opportunities and social mobility was 
perceived to be high, while in the later period from 1997 onwards, when social mobility was 
considered to be low, it affected people’s happiness negatively. Alesina et al. (2004) already 
conjectured that inequality may affect people with specific values and specific views on social 
mobility in their societies differently, even if inequality in general is not associated with 
happiness.    
                                                                                                                                                   
their income with a reference level. In our study, inequality rather refers to differences in absolute income across 
persons and the presence of redistributive government activities. 
4
 This is in line with Hopkins’ (2008) ‘rivalry model in conspicuous consumption’ according to which income 
inequality increases individual utility under certain conditions (high income and consumption levels, and a quite 
dense income distribution), as greater incentives to compete in consumption are generated. 
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We present a small stylized theoretical model, which serves to illustrate our main 
arguments and derive some testable hypotheses. This model analyzes individual life-time 
utility maximization (in expectational terms) with a two-period time horizon, a human capital 
investment phase and a phase in which the returns on investments are consumed. Here, 
investment decisions depend on social mobility perceptions, while the return on investment 
depends on actual social mobility – our model allows both to differ. The model predicts that 
persons with higher perceived fairness will – on average, but not in every single case – 
experience higher levels of utility and be less in favor of income redistribution. Societies with 
higher levels of actual social mobility are characterized by an institutional framework which 
rewards individual investments to a larger extent. 
According to the model, in a country with high actual and perceived social mobility, 
individuals will invest more in human capital and thus, on average, realize more favorable 
economic outcomes – in terms of own income, but also concerning general economic growth. 
For this group of countries, most of the population will perceive fairness to be relatively high 
and only a small portion will underestimate actual mobility – we therefore expect a positive 
effect of an interaction between perceived fairness and income inequality on happiness: As 
more equal incomes reflect higher taxes and more expansive income redistribution, having 
less inequality would lower the utility of most of the population who, after actually having 
successfully invested, do not benefit from compensating income transfers to low-investing 
individuals.  
In contrast, a low-mobility country, characterized by institutions impeding social 
mobility, may suffer from the following problem: With actual social mobility being low, the 
group of individuals who overestimate mobility tends to be the largest in the population, in 
contrast to high mobility countries. Individuals in this group are, however, with an (from their 
viewpoint unexpectedly) high probability not rewarded for their investments, given an 
institutional framework that is actually less fair than perceived ex ante. Thus, ex post, higher 
perceived fairness in countries with low actual upward mobility will induce a disappointment 
effect for most of the population, as the actual return does not meet the expected return, and 
there is (subjectively) not even an unfair societal framework to put the blame on. For most of 
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the population, this utility-lowering effect of fairness perceptions is enlarged as income 
inequality rises, reflecting smaller compensating government transfers to failed investors.  
To explore the link between perceptions of fairness, inequality, and happiness 
empirically we use data from the World Values Survey 1997-2001 and estimate a happiness 
function. We employ Gini coefficients to measure income inequality, four different proxies 
for individuals’ perceived fairness of the income generating process, and the interaction of 
inequality with these proxies. The empirical analysis aims to explore whether and to what 
extent perceived fairness mediates the potential effects of inequality, differentiating between 
countries with low and high actual social mobility. We also investigate the relation between 
fairness perceptions and the demand for redistribution, mediating the impact of fairness on 
life satisfaction. 
We find that persons who believe the income generating process in their society to be 
fair appear to be happier and demand less income equalization (and redistribution) by the 
government. We also find strong empirical support for the disappointment effect in countries 
with unfavorable institutions hampering social mobility, while for countries where institutions 
facilitate equal investment opportunities and access to markets – thus triggering a close 
relationship between individual effort and market outcomes – a positive interaction between 
income inequality and fairness perceptions is only weakly supported. The interaction results 
are corroborated in smaller samples based on actual mobility through the education system. 
Section 2 presents a literature review, and our stylized theoretical model motivating 
the empirical analysis. From the model we then derive testable hypotheses. Data and methods 
are described in Section 3, while Section 4 presents the results. The final section concludes 
and discusses the implications of our findings. 
 
2. Happiness, inequality and fairness: theory 
2.1 Preliminary considerations and the literature 
In 1944, Austrian economist and social philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1944, 88) argued that 
“To produce the same results for different people, it is necessary to treat them differently. To 
give different people the same objective opportunities is not to give them the same subjective 
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chances.” From this it follows, as Hayek suggested, that forcing individuals’ outcomes to be 
identical and ‘fair’ implies treating people unequally, and, thus, ‘unfairly’. The relation 
between what could be termed ‘fairness’ or other moral judgments of processes and outcomes 
and social inequality is therefore far from simple and straightforward. 
The treatment of ‘utility’ in the economics literature, both by the empirical research on 
happiness as well as standard economic theory, has usually focused on pure outcomes and 
neglected social comparisons. Yet, individuals do not only derive satisfaction from outcomes, 
but probably compare themselves to others, and also enjoy ‘procedural utility’ (Veblen 1899, 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2005). If people gain the impression that processes 
affecting their own situation are ‘fair’, they are not only likely to directly derive procedural 
utility from that fact, but also tend to evaluate the outcomes of these processes differently than 
if their subjective perception of the process is that it is ‘unfair’. For example, most people 
strongly dislike losing games or sports matches, but the impact of a loss is much stronger if 
they have the – reasonable or unreasonable – impression that their opponent has not played by 
the rules. Similarly, Stutzer and Frey (2003) show that two-thirds of the beneficial effects of 
people’s influence in the political decision-making process is not through their impact on 
resulting policy outcomes, but through the procedural utility gained from participating and 
civic engagement. Experimental evidence tends to support Hayek’s broad argument: Recent 
economic experiments reveal that inequality in profits is the more tolerated (by otherwise 
generally inequity-averse individuals) the more the process leading to its generation was 
perceived as ‘fair’. Experimental research has even identified the corresponding neurological 
process in the reward center of the human brain (see Hopkins, 2008, for a summary).  
To sum up, economic experiments show that if the process of reaching an outcome has 
been fair, then subjects in general bear an adverse outcome more easily. In contrast to our 
study, the set-up of these experiments is fairly simple, allowing actual fairness of the process 
and perceived fairness of the distribution process to coincide. However, one decisive 
contribution of our paper is to draw conclusions differentiating between actual and perceived 
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fairness, which may or may not overlap, reflecting the more complex real-world situations not 
allowing individuals to objectively observe actual social mobility in their societies.5 
These theoretical and experimental arguments can be applied to how individuals may 
evaluate the distribution of income in society. Their subjective evaluation of the outcome – 
the inequality of incomes – is likely to depend on their perceptions of the processes creating 
the distribution and their evaluations of the fairness of those processes. Such a conjecture has 
already been made by Alesina et al. (2004) to explain the differential effect of income 
inequality on happiness of survey respondents in the U.S. compared to those in Western 
Europe. For a sample of 30 OECD countries in the WVS, Fischer (2009) finds that in a 
socially mobile society (from the interviewees’ points of view) the negative effect of income 
inequality on well-being is mitigated, if not overcompensated. Likewise, in economic 
laboratory experiments Mitchell et al. (1993: 636) find that “inequality becomes more 
acceptable as people are better rewarded for their efforts,” which can be interpreted as an 
indication for a mediating effect of the fairness of the distribution process of ‘rewards’, i.e., 
wage incomes, on the relationship between inequality and happiness.  
In this paper, we define an income generating process as ‘fair’ if there is a direct link 
between own investment in human capital, on-the-job effort and individual economic 
outcome. The looser this link becomes, i.e., the more the individual outcome depends on 
chance, the less fair the income generating process is. This would also be the case if income 
differences were caused mainly by individual differences in innate talent or ability that cannot 
be compensated by effort. Such initial endowments could also include inherited wealth. On 
the other hand, if individuals’ perceptions of society indicate that ‘someone’ – either 
individually or collectively (e.g., through political decision-making) – is responsible for the 
shape of the income distribution, moral judgments on fairness will arguably come to rest on a 
different foundation. 
Actual (objective) and perceived (subjective) fairness in the income generation 
process is often not clearly distinguished by the early theoretical and empirical literature on 
happiness or preferences for redistribution. Most studies implicitly – Alesina et al. (2004) 
                                               
5
 Indeed, our model suggests that if perceived fairness is high and actual fairness has a corresponding level, the 
positive effect of inequality on subjective well-being rises with perceived fairness.  
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even explicitly – assume that subjectively perceived and objectively existing fairness in 
society correspond perfectly. However, the empirical happiness analysis for 30 OECD 
countries by Fischer (2009) suggests that perceived and actual social mobility in society are 
not necessarily strongly correlated. For this reason, we explicitly differentiate between actual 
and perceived fairness and put them in a systematic relation. In particular, we hypothesize that 
whether the happiness effects of income inequality is aggravated or reduced by fairness 
perceptions for most of the population hinges on whether their perceived and the actual 
fairness coincide or diverge.  
Fairness perceptions can also be argued to diverge according to political convictions: 
Leftwing parties place more weight on equity of outcomes (so-called ‘social justice’), while 
rightwing governments place more weight on efficiency and equality in opportunities as 
voters’ definitions of fairness differ systematically across parties (Scott et al. 2001). 
Fundamental differences in fairness perceptions would thus suggest that leftwing voters are 
sensitive mainly to income inequality, but less to procedural fairness as a determinant of 
market income (see also the empirical test in Fischer 2009). In contrast, rightwing voters have 
offsetting efficiency concerns, which lead them to focus more on equality of opportunities, 
and to accept the resulting income inequality more easily. In a conservative perspective, 
relatively large income differences might be seen as an indication that individuals who work 
hard receive their just deserts. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2004) find that left-wing voters are more 
concerned about income inequality than right-wing or centrist voters, both in Europe and the 
U.S. We therefore employ the respondent’s political ideology as one proxy of her fairness 
perception. 
In the course of this analysis, we predict a negative relation between fairness 
perceptions and the demand for income redistribution, which we also test against our data. 
The relation between social mobility (perceptions) and the preference for equal incomes has 
been analyzed in a couple of previous studies. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), using Russian 
micro data, were the first to show that self-assessed expected own social mobility, or the belief 
of being on a rising income trajectory, leads to lower demand for redistribution. Corneo and 
Gruener (2002) present a ‘public values effect’ model, concluding that “an individual who 
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believes in the importance of personal hard work [for income] is expected to oppose 
redistribution” (ibidem, p.86), preceding the similar arguments in Alesina et al. (2004). In 
Corneo and Gruener’s (2002) logit regressions, run with about 30 countries in various 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) waves on the question ‘Government should 
reduce inequality’, both generalized fairness perceptions and perceived past social mobility 
reduce the demand for equalizing incomes.6 In contrast, persons reporting that ‘they would 
gain [from redistribution]’ are in favor of such government policy. Population preferences for 
and against redistribution are captured by country fixed effects, an approach that we will 
follow below. A negative relation between personal income and preferences for redistribution 
is not only shown in Corneo and Gruener (2002), but also by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). 
Using US General Social Survey (GSS) data, the latter corroborate the negative relation 
between perceived equal opportunities, subjective income prospects, income, and a history of 
past social mobility, with a preference for income redistribution.7 Exploiting the longitudinal 
nature of their panel data, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) construct two objective measures of 
actual income prospects, at the individual and state level. They find both to be strongly 
negatively related with individual demand for more equal incomes. Contrasting results are 
reported in Clark and D’Angelo (2008) for the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) who 
identify a positive association between own experienced social mobility (‘having higher 
socio-economic status than parents’) and being in favor of having capped incomes, or state-
ownership, and being left-wing.8  
In the following, we develop a simple workhorse model, illustrating the potential 
impact of income inequality and fairness perceptions on individual well-being. 
 
 
                                               
6
 Fairness perceptions are measured by the question ‘hard work is the key [to success]’, while social mobility 
experience is captured by the variable ‘better off than father’.  
7
 Preference for redistribution is measured by the question ‘Should government reduce income difference 
between rich and poor?’. Past history of social mobility is measured by ‘having a job prestige higher than 
father’s’, and subjective income prospects are proxied by ‘expect a better life’. Equal opportunities as source of 
economic success are approximated by the question ‘Get ahead: hard work’, while unequal opportunities are 
approximated with the statement ‘Get ahead: luck/help’. 
8
 This study employs the measure ‘The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money that any 
one person can make’, which is not fully comparable to that used in previous empirical analyses.  
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2.2 The basic set-up of the model 
Following, among others, Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), we assume that reported 
subjective well-being or ‘happiness’ of an individual i is an increasing function of her actual, 
directly unobservable utility where εi is an error-term:  
 
The error term reflects unobservable differences across individuals, such as different 
subjective interpretations of the ordinal scale on which individual well-being is reported. This 
assumption allows us to focus on standard economic utility considerations in the theoretical 
analysis, i.e., on the underlying economic forces that influence individual welfare.  
Our simple workhorse model rests, in a first step, on a standard labor supply decision. 
Let individuals maximize a standard utility function (henceforth the index i is dropped for 
notational simplification) where x is private consumption and e is effort invested into gaining 
the household income, and where ux > 0, uxx < 0, ue < 0, uee < 0: 
 
Individuals face a household budget constraint  
 
 
where l ∈ {0,1} reflects labor supply on the extensive margin, and t is a uniform tax rate on 
labor income ω(e,σ) which in turn depends positively on both effort and an individual ability 
parameter σ. We assume ωe > 0, ωσ > 0, ωeσ > 0 and ω(0,σ)=0. T is a lump-sum transfer that 
is granted by the welfare state to individuals who do not enter the labor market. It is financed 
through the revenue from the income tax on labor incomes. 
Wi=w(ui)+εi 
 
(1) 
u=u(x,e) 
 
(2) 
 
x=l(1-t)ω(e,σ)+(1-l)T 
 
(3) 
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2.3 Individual labor supply decisions 
On the intensive margin, individuals need to determine an optimal level of effort that they are 
willing to invest if they enter the labor market. Assuming for now that their skill parameter σ 
is exogenously fixed (reflecting, e.g., upbringing, genetically determined intelligence), 
maximizing the utility function straightforwardly yields (4) as the f.o.c. given l=1. 
Given the assumption of standard properties of the utility function, this unambiguously 
determines an optimal level of effort e* and it is immediately clear that individuals will 
increase effort with increasing ability and a decreasing tax rate, since both changes shift their 
marginal utility from increasing effort upward: 
e
*
=e
*(σ, t) 
 
(5) 
Moreover, a second decision has to be made on the extensive margin. Individuals will choose 
l=1 iff 
u((1-t)ω(e*,σ), e*) > u(T,0). 
 
(6) 
Given that the left-hand side of the inequality (6) is strictly increasing with σ and strictly 
decreasing with t, we can state that for any strictly positive tax rate generating a positive T to 
be redistributed, there must exist some ˆ σ  > 0 where l=0∀σ≤ ˆ σ  and l=1∀σ> ˆ σ .  
The degree of income inequality does therefore crucially depend on the distribution of 
the skill parameter σ in the population. Furthermore, it also depends on the tax rate t chosen. 
Increasing the tax rate, and simultaneously increasing the transfer T, reduces labor supply 
both on the extensive and on the intensive margin, which reduces income inequality as long as 
individuals with sufficiently high ability levels are still working and generating the tax base 
necessary for redistribution.  
Strict economic considerations thus imply that individuals characterized by relatively 
high skill levels achieve higher utility levels, and are less in favor of redistribution. Our 
workhorse model in its simplest form thus suggests that we should find a negative relationship 
∂u
∂ω
∂ω
∂e (1− t) = −
∂u
∂e  
 
(4) 
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between a taste for redistribution and individual well-being in the data. The underlying 
economic mechanism is a simple positive income effect. The model also suggests that – on 
average – better educated people should achieve higher utility levels if their type of education 
positively influences their income-earning opportunities, because for them the impact of effort 
on income is more pronounced than for less educated individuals.  
 
2.4 Endogenizing skills 
In a second step, the model can be made somewhat more realistic if we account for the fact 
that individual skills are normally only in part a result of exogenous characteristics (such as 
genetically determined ability and talent), but are to a large degree determined by the choice 
of own investment in human capital. Suppose now for simplification that individuals who do 
not invest in their human capital remain at an unimproved, default skill level σ < ˆ σ . The 
impact of an investment in skills is, on the other hand, not deterministic – the investment can 
fail, e.g., because the individual mistakenly invests in skills that eventually do not relate to the 
skills demanded on the labor market. A different explanation for the uncertainty related to the 
investment could be that employers eventually look for a combination of personal traits, 
abilities, and job-related skills, and that individuals with unfavorable, but unalterable personal 
traits are confronted with the problem that high job-related skills may not overcompensate 
their adverse personal characteristics. 
Suppose that investing an amount H >0 increases the skill parameter with an objective 
probability p, and with σH>0 and σHH<0. With a probability (1- p) the investment fails and 
the individual remains low-skilled. We do, however, allow individuals to have a subjective 
perception p of the probability of success, p. Expected utility for individuals investing a 
positive amount H in human capital is then 
pu(ω(e*,σ )(1− t) − H,e*) + (1− p)u(T − H,0)  
 
(7) 
where e* is now the optimal effort level, given a choice of H and a resulting level of σ. Both 
are strictly increasing in H if the investment was successful. From the individual perspective, 
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the optimal level H* that maximizes (7) is strictly increasing in the subjective probability p. 
The alternative would be to not invest at all. Setting H=0 yields the default utility from 
transfer incomes with certainty. Comparing both states of the world, we see that the individual 
will invest into human capital iff  
pu(ω(e*,σ)(1− t) − H*,e*) + (1− p)u(T − H*,0) > u(T,0) 
 
(8) 
An individual is deterred from investing a large amount of resources into human capital by a 
high tax rate t, but in particular by a low subjective probability p of successfully reaching the 
higher skill level. Furthermore, we can infer from condition (8) that there must exist some 
strictly positive threshold level ˆ p where for every p < ˆ p individuals do not enter the labor 
market and find it individually optimal to remain uneducated. 
 
It may still appear as somewhat unconventional from a strict rational expectations point of 
view to assume a subjective probability p that can differ from its objective counterpart p . 
Thus, a short explanation is probably in order. With a sufficiently heterogeneous population, 
individuals are likely to differ with regard to their personal traits and abilities, only some of 
which being directly unobservable by third parties. It is then unlikely that observing the 
success or failure of other individuals’ investments in human capital will supply them with 
sufficient information about their own objective probabilities of being successful themselves. 
It therefore appears to be reasonable to interpret p as a subjective, a priori assessment made 
by a single individual, and individuals will differ with regard to their expected values of p . 
Having a low p for oneself reflects that one expects the labor market to be relatively 
rigid for oneself, in the sense that one does not expect it to be likely that one’s own and 
others’ investments into human capital will be rewarded by high wage incomes. Even more 
importantly, such an individual expects that if her investment failed, and if she nevertheless 
entered the labor market with the default low σ =σ , then the elasticity of wages with respect 
to her own effort would be very low. In this sense, a low p reflects a sense of being excluded 
from high income earning opportunities. The opposite is true for very high values of p: they 
reflect an optimistic perspective on upward mobility in the labor market, and an individual’s 
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expectation that, ultimately, investing H* in her stock of human capital and subsequently 
supplying the effort level e* is a reasonably safe way to earning high market incomes.  
In this sense, in our model the subjective probability p captures subjectively perceived 
fairness, indicating how close individuals perceive the relationship between human capital 
investment, effort and market income to be. Given the discussion above, there clearly is a 
potential for self-fulfilling prophecies. Individuals perceiving the economic framework as 
unfair, yielding low upwards mobility, invest low amounts of resources, or none at all, in 
improving their skill level. Accordingly, ex post successful, but ex ante relatively more 
pessimistic investors suffer from being relatively less affluent than ex post successful 
individuals who were ex ante more optimistic in perceiving their environment as fair.  
  
2.5 Subjective well-being and fairness: testable hypotheses 
The theoretical model sketched above allows us to derive some empirically testable 
hypotheses regarding the interaction of income inequality, fairness perceptions and subjective 
well-being.  
 
Hypothesis 1. Individuals who expect p to be high (individuals with a high value of 
p) are more likely to report high levels of subjective well-being than individuals who 
expect that p is low (whose value of p is low).  
 
Remember that in our model p reflects subjectively perceived fairness of the labor market, 
i.e., how tightly income, human capital investments and effort are correlated from an 
individual’s point of view. Thus, the individual propensity to actually invest H* in order to 
increase the individual skill level also increases with p. Expected life-time utility is therefore, 
ceteris paribus, larger for individuals who believe to be participating in a fairer environment, 
characterized by a more immediate, and stronger positive relationship between individual 
effort and individual economic success. 
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With regard to the individual attitude towards income redistribution and its association with 
levels of well-being, we can subsequently state 
 
Hypothesis 2. Individual demand for income redistribution decreases with perceived 
fairness p, while vice versa the belief that disposable incomes should be distributed 
more equally is expected to be negatively associated with reported well-being. 
 
Again, the positive effect of the subjectively assessed p on expected individual life-time 
income (and utility) is mainly responsible. According to our model, if an individual believes 
p  to be sufficiently low (i.e., if her p is low), she chooses H*=0 and eventually consumes 
only a relatively low transfer income. Any increase in transfers (reflected in a resulting 
decrease in income inequality) would make her relatively more affluent and thereby increase 
her utility, while the belief in a low p by itself is associated with relatively low individual 
welfare.  
 
Hypothesis 2 hints at a close connection between fairness perceptions and policy preferences: 
In our model, those who believe the world to be very unfair and who do not participate in the 
labor market at all unambiguously prefer higher levels of income redistribution, and they do 
so out of immediate self-interest: Their belief in unfairness has made them less affluent. For 
the remaining individuals, note that even if they participate, a declining value of p reflects an 
increased perceived risk of failure, in which case, if it realized, they would eventually be 
forced to live off transfers. Thus, the proposed relationship between fairness perceptions and 
preferences for redistribution is also found for these individuals.  
 
The effect of actual reductions of inequality on utility is a slightly different issue. To see this, 
remember that p is the true value of the probability that human capital investments are 
successful, which is unknown to individuals at the time of their investment decision H*. Also, 
remember from Eq. (8) that ˆ p  denotes the level of perceived fairness where for any p ≥ ˆ p  the 
individual decides to invest, and then enter the labor market and not to live off transfers. Then 
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we can distinguish three types of individuals, depending on the relation between subjective 
success probability p, participation threshold ˆ p , and actual mobility p :  
(i) Individuals with p < ˆ p ≤ p  choose not to enter the labor market and immediately benefit 
from higher transfers and a reduction of inequality;  
(ii) Individuals with ˆ p ≤ p < p enter the labor market and choose H*>0, but since the true 
success probability is underestimated, any increase in perceived fairness would both lead to 
increased inequality and more favorable expected economic outcomes. Thus, we expect a 
positive interaction between perceived fairness and inequality for these individuals;  
(iii) finally, individuals with p ≥ p ≥ ˆ p  invest relatively large amounts H*>0, but are also 
characterized by overoptimism, expressed by an ex ante unexpectedly high rate of eventual ex 
post failure, resulting in 'disappointment'. When this third group becomes larger, overall 
income inequality increases: Both the lucky and the unlucky over-investors fatten the 
respective tails of the income distribution. Since failure is more pervasive, however, a 
negative interaction of fairness and income inequality can be expected for this group. 
 
It is difficult to directly observe individual-specific objective probabilities of success and 
failure. We can, however, distinguish between types of countries, namely countries with low 
or, alternatively, with high social mobility, or institutions granting equal opportunities and 
facilitating market access, respectively, resulting in a low and a high impact of individual 
effort on market income, or in the context of our model: p LOW < p HIGH . In countries with 
sufficiently low actual social mobility, the first two groups become small enough to be 
dominated by the third group, whose members have a p greater than p . This is in contrast to 
the population composition in countries with sufficiently high actual social mobility, where 
the first two groups dominate the third. Thus, individual over-optimism and strong 
disappointment is more likely to be a problem of low mobility countries than of countries 
where the income generating process is indeed very fair. Due to these considerations, we can 
state 
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Hypothesis 3. In countries with low actual social mobility, a negative interaction 
between fairness perceptions and actual inequality on well-being is expected, while 
for countries with high actual social mobility a positive impact of increasing fairness 
interacting with increasing inequality on well-being is predicted. 
 
In low-mobility countries, government measures which redistribute incomes – and thereby 
also reduce inequality – increase the subjective well-being of a relatively large group of 
individuals who have overinvested due to an unrealistically high fairness perception, and who 
eventually failed in their effort. The situation is different for high mobility countries. Here, 
marginally increasing fairness perceptions, and accordingly individual investment levels, 
allows more favorable equilibria to be realized, where the actual institutional scope for 
upward mobility ( p ) is more fully utilized. Due to Hypothesis 1, this should go hand in hand 
with an increased acceptance of income inequality. With the third group – people over-
investing in human capital – dominated by the first two groups in high-mobility countries, we 
expect income inequality and fairness perceptions to interact positively with respect to their 
impact on well-being in this group of countries.  
 
As an additional point concerning the disappointment effect experienced ex post by the third 
group of overinvesting individuals, note also that individuals who suffer from failed 
investments themselves do not need to revise their fairness perception: For any p<1, being 
unsuccessful oneself can still be consistent with a coincidence of overall, societal fairness 
with personal shortcoming. But in this case, fairness is obviously not a source of welfare; 
rather personal failure in a fair labor market and the forgone investment of H* will be a 
particularly severe source of unhappiness.   
 
 
3. Data and Method 
3.1. Data 
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In order to empirically test Hypotheses 1 to 3, we employ data from the pooled third and 
fourth waves of the World Values Survey, covering the years 1994-2001 (Inglehart et al., 
2004). The availability of reliable and internationally comparable Gini data restricts our 
choice of WVS data to around the year 1995. We follow the standard approach in the 
literature by using individuals’ responses to the question “All things considered, how satisfied 
are you with your life as a whole these days?" as proxy for (remembered) utility and the 
dependent variable for hypotheses 1 and 3. The responses are distributed on a ten-point scale 
ranging from 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied), with a sample mean of 
about 6.3.9 In order to estimate a set of relevant personal characteristics forming the core of 
individuals’ happiness functions, we rely on the robust baseline model in Bjørnskov, Dreher 
and Fischer (2008). The country-level control variables include only country fixed effects, to 
avoid biasing the impact of the inequality measure through the choice of macro-controls. At 
the individual level, we include measures of age, gender, family type, religion, religiosity and 
spirituality. The baseline model is complemented with a wave dummy and age cohort effects. 
The empirical models exclude measures of education, income and occupational status that, 
according to the theoretical model, should fully mediate an individual’s subjective success 
probability p (fairness perception). They are, however, included in additional tests further 
below. 
 Measures of vertical and horizontal trust (such as confidence in political institutions 
and trust in other people) do not form part of the baseline model as they may be strongly 
correlated with perceived fairness and could thus be transmission channels for our variable of 
main interest.10 Due to data availability, the baseline sample is reduced to approximately 
146,000 respondents from 68 countries; depending on the employed fairness measure, it may 
even be reduced further. The baseline results for the micro-level determinants of subjective 
well-being (SWB) in the present sample are similar to those in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer 
                                               
9
 The WVS includes questions on both life satisfaction and happiness, but the correlation between happiness and 
satisfaction is surprisingly low (rho = 0.44). We opt for using the life satisfaction question since 1) translation 
problems seem to yield cross-country comparisons of answers to the other question less comparable and 2) the 
happiness question is more likely to capture the affective component of subjective well-being rather than its 
cognitive component. 
10
 Note that the inclusion of a measure of horizontal trust does not alter the main results of our analysis (e.g., in 
Tables 6 and 7), but does reduce the size of the regression samples by between 3000 and 6000 observations. 
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(2008) – they are reported in Column 1 of Table A1 in Appendix A, while Appendix B 
presents descriptive statistics.11   
 
Measures of self-report procedural fairness and demand for income redistribution 
Individuals’ fairness evaluations of income inequality are approximated using definitions of 
fairness in the income generation process in the labor market. They include measures of social 
mobility in the labor market, such as, e.g., whether hard work determines economic success. 
All fairness perception proxies are constructed as dichotomous variables, taking on the value 
‘1’ if the respondent believes that procedural fairness is present in society, and ‘0’ if 
otherwise. These definitions of fairness perceptions have also been employed in previous 
studies such as Corneo and Gruener (2002) and Alesina and LaFerrara (2005). In addition, we 
approximate fairness perceptions by employing information on individual political self-
positioning on a leftist-conservative scale, arguing that conservative persons favor fairness in 
the income generation process, while leftist oriented persons are more outcome-oriented. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the fairness perception measures included in this study. 
 The demand for income redistribution is measured using three proxies derived from the 
World Values Survey. These variables, originally recorded on a 10-point or, respectively, a 5-
point scale, were aggregated into dichotomous indicators (‘1’ = pro redistribution) in order to 
facilitate the empirical analysis in the probit models and, particularly, the interpretation of the 
results. They resemble the measures of income redistribution through governments employed 
in Corneo and Gruener (2002) and Alesina and LaFerrara (2005). Table 1 provides on 
overview of the variables employed and their exact codings. 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                                               
11
 For a detailed discussion of these results see Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008). 
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Measures of actual social mobility 
To test Hypothesis 3, perceived social mobility (perceived fairness/equal opportunities) needs 
to be distinguished from actual social mobility. Unfortunately, cross-nationally comparable 
social mobility measures are hardly available on a large scale. To exploit the large sample size 
of up to 68 countries, we suggest using several proxies of actual social mobility. First, we 
employ the Gastil index of civil liberties (Freedom House 2007) and the Fraser Index of 
Economic Freedom (Gwartney and Lawson 2008). Second, following Fischer (2009), we 
employ measures of intergenerational mobility in terms of educational attainment, in 
particular whether student performance depends on parental background. These direct 
measures of social mobility are, however, only available for a small subsample of OECD 
countries.  
The rationale for using indices of economic freedom is that social mobility is only 
possible in an institutional framework that allows for free choice of occupation in a liberalized 
labor market, easy access to the national credit market (all measured by area 5 of the Fraser 
index, ranging from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest)), a government size not too large, triggering 
modest taxation of capital and income (captured by area 1), a sound monetary policy that 
does not hamper investment (area 3). In addition, legal quality and the protection of property 
rights (area 2) as well as openness to the international goods markets and access to foreign 
capital (area 4) may equally be prerequisites for a socially mobile society and actual 
procedural fairness in the income generation process. Similarly, the Gastil index of civil 
liberties (range: 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest)) captures not only freedoms of expression and 
religion, but also the economically important dimensions of freedom of assembly, association 
(such as unions and firm cartels), and equal opportunities in education.  
To test for the robustness of our results, we employ measures of actual social mobility. 
We use a measure of educational mobility based on the PISA 2003 Mathematics results, 
obtained from Fischer (2009) and available for 27 countries in our baseline sample. 
Educational mobility is the average advantage of having a high-education family background, 
expressed in test score points. More specifically, it is the average difference between the 
performance of students with such an advantageous family background compared to average 
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student performance. The closer this difference is to zero, the more independent is student 
performance from parental background, and the more socially mobile is a country’s education 
system. Appendix C presents the values of these actual social mobility measures for OECD 
countries.  
 
Measure of income inequality 
The Gini coefficients for testing Hypothesis 3 are obtained from UNU (2006) and relate 
roughly to the year 1995.12 We have chosen to obtain the Gini values from this specific 
database because the authors undertook special care to use reliable, high-quality income 
information to calculate the Gini coefficients to ensure its cross-country comparability; non-
comparability of Gini coefficients across countries constitutes a severe problem with 
alternative income inequality information (e.g., from the World Development Indicators 
database). As the Gini measure refers to a cross-section of countries only, its true effect 
cannot be identified due to its multicollinearity with the country fixed effects. However, 
Hypothesis 3 can be tested by interacting our fairness measures with the Gini coefficient. 
Appendix C displays the values for the 68 countries in the baseline sample.  
 
 
3.2. Method 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive association of individual fairness perceptions (pi = perceived 
fairness of individual i) with individual’s life satisfaction. For testing Hypothesis 1, we simply 
add the four fairness perception measures to the baseline happiness model and observe their 
relations with subjective well-being (SWBi = f(fairnessi, Μι  ...)). Vector Μι  includes 
the individual-level control variables, country fixed effects, a wave dummy and cohort effects, 
as described above. According to the theoretical model, in equilibrium, the effects of fairness 
perceptions should entirely run through own income, education and occupational status, 
                                               
12
 Gini coefficients all are calculated on the basis of gross income or earnings and are thus prior to any 
redistribution. However, Bergh (2005) shows for 11 OECD countries high quality national statistics systems that 
the difference between pre-transfer and post-transfer Ginis is not a reliable measure of actual government 
redistribution.  
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which we therefore exclude from the vector Μι  of the baseline specification. We test whether 
these variables are transmission channels for our main variables of interest and therefore also 
report specifications including them.  
 
SWBi = α' fairnessi +β'Μι + ui . (9) 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that perceiving the income generation process as fair lowers the demand 
for income redistribution, while demanding more redistribution itself is predicted to be 
negatively associated with subjective well-being. In other words, Hypothesis 2 views equation 
(9) as reduced function of the chained function (SWBi = f (REDi (fairnessi ...) …). We test this 
hypothesis by, first, estimating a model of demand for income redistribution, with the 
identical variable of interest and the same set of control variables as in equation (9). The 
estimated coefficient γ' indicates the effect of fairness perceptions on the probability to be in 
favor of redistribution: 
 
Pr(RED)i= γ'fairnessi + β'Μι + ui . (10) 
 
In a second step, we relate subjective well-being to the demand for redistribution, expecting a 
negative relation: 
 
SWBi = REDi + β'Μι + ui. (11) 
 
To test Hypothesis 3, we add the interactions of the responses to one of those fairness 
perception questions with income inequality in their home country as measured by the Gini 
coefficient to equation (9).13 
 
SWBi = fairnessi + fairnessi ∗ GINI + β'Μι + u . (12) 
                                               
13
 A potential worry with these data would arise if they simply proxied for individuals’ income positions. 
However, the responses are only weakly associated with individual incomes. 
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In estimating the model of subjective well-being we follow the previous literature (see, e.g., 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer 2008), but employ OLS in which coefficient estimates also 
represent marginal effects, facilitating the interpretation of the interaction terms. This 
approach follows Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), who show that OLS is a feasible 
estimation procedure for a 10-point categorical happiness variable by employing the 10-
category life satisfaction question in the German Socio-Economic Panel, the analogue of 
which we have obtained from the WVS.  
Given the dichotomous nature of the measures of preference for income redistribution, 
the model of redistributive preferences is estimated as probit model, which greatly facilitates 
the calculation of the marginal effects (for the probability of reporting a pro-redistributive 
political statement). Even though the analysis focuses on the direction of (significant) 
influences of the fairness perceptions estimates, we also discuss their relative quantitative 
effects. 
The next section reports the results. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Some basic correlations 
Prior to turning to the multivariate analysis it may be worthwhile to investigate a couple of 
simple correlations between individual life satisfaction and perceived and objective fairness, 
or, respectively, social mobility.   
 Simple correlations between measures of fairness perceptions and individual life 
satisfaction are rather low or moderate, with coefficient values ranging between roughly 0.05 
(hard work) and 0.2 (chance to escape poverty). Correlations with measures of actual social 
mobility are somewhat larger, for civil liberties (Gastil) and economic freedom (full Fraser 
index), between 0.23 and 0.26 (in absolute terms). For the subsample of OECD countries, 
measures of social mobility in terms of educational attainment show correlations similar in 
size to that of economic freedom, with coefficients for maternal and paternal educational 
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dependence of 0.20 and 0.22, respectively. Finally, the correlation between income inequality 
and life satisfaction is positive, but fairly small (0.06).  
 In general, correlations of roughly 0.4 to 0.6 are achieved when an aggregate measure 
of happiness in place of individual subjective well-being is employed. Using the mean of life 
satisfaction in a country, economic freedom shows a correlation of about 0.5 to 0.6, and social 
mobility in education of about 0.6 – 0.7. Only the Gini coefficients still show a small 
correlation of 0.14 with country means in life satisfaction, possibly indicating their 
subsample-specific heterogeneous effect. Employing aggregated individual data on the four 
fairness perceptions measures, correlations with country means in life satisfaction range from 
0.06 to 0.4 and are, for at least two measures (poverty due to laziness and chance to escape 
poverty), considerably large.  
 
4.2. Testing Hypothesis 1: Fairness perceptions and subjective well-being 
Table 2 tests Hypothesis 1 by including the proxies for perceived fairness to the baseline 
specification of the well-being model, one-by-one. Overall, Table 2 tests four fairness 
measures, yielding four model variants. The table displays only the estimation results for the 
fairness measure and the number of individual observations in the corresponding regression 
samples; the full model estimations are displayed in the Appendix of this paper (Table A1, 
columns 2 – 5). The constant in the regressions is in most cases around 8 SWB points (not 
reported), and the adjusted R2 ranges between 0.2 and 0.25, depending on the model 
specification.14  
First, note the positive signs of the perceived-fairness estimates, indicating that 
persons with strong fairness perceptions, a high p, are indeed happier compared to those who 
have a different view. As all four fairness estimates are significant at the 1 percent level, the 
results are clearly in line with Hypothesis 1. The quantitative impact of these variables is 
considerable, with coefficients ranging between 0.22 (hard work) and 0.57 (laziness). 
Comparing these effects with those of other determinants of subjective well-being as reported 
                                               
14
 The constant can be interpreted as the baseline SWB level of the reference group, which, in this specification, 
has low fairness perceptions, is male, has no children, is religious but not affiliated to a major religion, is 
divorced or separated from her partner, does not believe in a superior being, and never attends religious service.  
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in the Appendix (Tables A1 and A2) shows that these effects are comparable with, e.g., taking 
part in religious service once a month as compared to never (0.22) or being married as 
compared to being divorced or separated (0.53). According to Table A2 in the Appendix, the 
largest associations of about half a life satisfaction category are observable for labor market 
mobility perceptions (‘people are poor due to laziness’ and ‘people have a chance to escape 
poverty’) and ‘conservative ideology’. Further investigation shows that these relative 
differences across fairness perception coefficients are not caused by changes in sample sizes 
across regressions (not reported). In summary, our empirical results are in line with 
Hypothesis 1, suggesting that persons who perceive the income generation process as fair 
experience higher levels of subjective well-being. 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
According to the theoretical model above, perceived social mobility should have a 
positive impact on individual human capital investments, expected life-time earnings and 
occupational status in equilibrium, with perceived social mobility affecting subjective well-
being through these transmission channels. As our next step, we therefore test the same 
empirical model specification including measures of education, income, and occupational 
status. Table 3 reports the results and shows analogously to Table 2 that persons who perceive 
themselves as living in a fair society experience higher levels of subjective well-being. In line 
with our model, persons with higher income or better education are happier (for full 
estimation results, again see Appendix Table A2). Comparing the fairness perception 
estimates across models (Tables 2 and 3), we observe for all four fairness perception measures 
smaller coefficient sizes in Table 3 – all differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. For example, the coefficient on ‘people have the chance to escape poverty’ is 0.483 in 
Table 2, but only 0.433 in Table 3. Thus, the SWB effects of fairness and social mobility 
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perceptions are partly mediated through own human capital investment. This finding is again 
in line with the theoretical model.  
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
4.3. Testing Hypothesis 2: Fairness perception, demand for redistribution, and subjective 
well-being 
Table 4 tests the prediction of Hypothesis 2 that persons who perceive the income generating 
process as fair are less favorable towards equalizing the income distribution, most probably 
through redistribution from the rich to the poor. We estimate probit models for the four 
fairness perception variables employed in the happiness models (Hypothesis 1) with three 
dichotomous proxies of preference for income redistribution as dependent variables 
(preference for ‘a more equal income distribution’, for ‘eliminating income inequality’, and 
for ‘guaranteeing basic needs’, respectively). Due to missing observations in regressors and 
regressands, not all 12 possible models could be estimated. For the larger samples, we observe 
values of Pseudo R2 between 0.05 and 0.08, a reasonable size for comparable probit 
estimations. Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates, its level of significance and the number 
of observations in the regression sample.  
Almost all regressions in Table 4 suggest that people who perceive the income 
generating process as fair are less in favor of redistribution through the government. This is 
observable for the measures ‘poverty due to laziness’, ‘chance to escape poverty’ and 
‘conservative ideology’. Notably, these individual ideology and perceived fairness effects are, 
given that we employ country fixed effects, independent of 'national' beliefs and political 
cultures. The marginal effects suggest that the effect of fairness perceptions decreases the 
probability of demanding government activities by between 3 and 13 percent. Thus, the 
results are in line with Hypothesis 2, suggesting that persons who believe in procedural 
fairness oppose government redistribution. 
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Somewhat astonishing is the increase in the probability of favoring a more equal 
income distribution expressed by persons who believe that ‘hard work brings success in the 
long run’, possibly reflecting a modern version of Weber’s hypothesis of a Protestant work 
ethic.15 Arguably, ‘having success’ is multidimensional, whereas ‘escaping poverty’ is one-
dimensionally related to gaining income only. However, as this variable can only be included 
in model 1, we cannot draw a clear conclusion whether the positive sign is a statistical artefact 
or indicates a generic relation.  
Overall, the results in Table 4 support the prediction of Hypothesis 2 that perceived 
social mobility reduces the demand for income redistribution from the rich to the poor. 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Table 5 tests the second part of Hypothesis 2, which predicts a negative relation 
between a preference for redistribution and individual welfare. This prediction translates into 
our empirical model based on the WVS that persons with a preference for ‘a more equal 
income distribution’, for ‘eliminating income inequality’, or for ‘guaranteeing basic needs’ 
(see Table 4) should report lower levels of subjective well-being. All three columns show 
that, indeed, persons who demand a more equal income distribution (potentially through 
government intervention) and guaranteed basic needs for everybody, are less satisfied with 
their lives compared to those with no such preferences. With coefficient estimates between 
-0.2 and -0.38, the quantitative effect on subjective well-being is of medium size, comparable 
to that of 'cohabiting' as opposed to being 'divorced or separated'. 
Overall, Tables 4 and 5 present evidence in line with Hypothesis 2: We find that those 
persons who perceive the society they live in as fair are less likely to demand a more equal 
                                               
15
 In the traditional Calvinist view and according to their predestination theory, only the efforts of the ’blessed’ 
would yield economic success, in contrast to that by the ’lost souls’. Thus, economic success in ‘this world’ is 
perceived by Calvinists as a signal for being chosen to have a good afterlife.  
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(post-tax and -transfer) income distribution. Furthermore, we also find that those who do 
demand more equal incomes report lower levels of life satisfaction. 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
4.4. Hypothesis 3: Inequality and fairness perceptions 
Hypothesis 3 relates fairness perceptions, actual fairness in society and income inequality to 
well-being. We test Hypothesis 3 by interacting the individual fairness perception variables 
with the Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality at the country level. In order to 
ease interpretation, the regression samples have been split by actual social mobility at the 
country level, as reflected by a country’s institutions that allow for taking advantage of 
economic opportunities and a country’s actual social mobility. In order to ease the 
interpretation of the regression results in view of Hypothesis 3, we start with a short 
discussion of the underlying contextual assumptions and the testable predictions. 
Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people do not act upon a precise 
estimate of how strong actual social mobility in a society is (Fischer 2009). Rather, there 
appears to be an optimism bias, and a large fraction of individuals believes that they have a 
relatively good chance of being successful as a result of effort and ambition, even though they 
may observe institutional rigidities.16 In principle, we can assume that ex ante perceived 
fairness levels are, on average, quite high, resulting in substantial investments. 
In countries with low social mobility, or with labor and capital market rigidities and 
frictions, even a high individual effort yields high levels of individual economic prosperity 
only with a low probability. In this type of countries, it is likely that most individuals are of 
the third type distinguished above (section 2.4). They suffer from an optimism bias 
manifested in an ex ante p > p , which, in turn, results in systematic overinvestment and large-
                                               
16
 This is an analogy to the observed optimism bias of criminals who believe, despite of well-known 
considerable objective detection rates, they will not be caught. For more empirical evidence on biases in 
probability judgments in the population regarding economic outcomes, see, for example, Dohmen et al. (2009).  
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scale ex post disappointment.17 The higher people’s perceived social mobility (and actual 
investment levels), the larger their disappointment, and the unhappier they become. This 
negative relation between SWB and p is aggravated by a rise in income inequality: According 
to the theoretical model, actual increases in inequality and reductions in income equalizing 
government transfers and taxes have an unambiguously negative effect on utility in countries 
with sufficiently low social mobility. Furthermore, in such countries we also expect 
individuals with higher personal fairness beliefs to benefit from increasing equality ex post, 
because the disappointment effect will affect larger portions of the population than in actually 
fairer countries. Thus, in the low social mobility sample, we should observe a negative 
interaction between perceived fairness and income inequality, resulting from ‘disappointment’ 
due to overinvestment.  
For countries with high upward mobility, we theoretically predicted a positive 
interaction between perceived fairness and inequality on reported individual well-being, due 
to the fact that individuals from the second group dominate in the population: individuals who 
have fairness perceptions p high enough to invest but still below the optimal level that is 
determined by actual social mobility, that is ˆ p ≤ p < p . An increase in fairness perceptions in 
these countries leads to an increase of ex post successful investments in equilibrium. 
Essentially, in countries with high actual upward mobility, institutional opportunities to earn 
higher incomes are used to a greater degree if perceived fairness increases. Redistributive 
taxation, on the other hand, decreases the individually optimal investment and therefore has a 
counteracting effect. A lower scale of redistributive taxation, and thus a higher degree of 
actual inequality, should therefore also have a positive impact on well-being in these 
countries.  
Tables 6 and 7 present the estimates for perceived fairness and its interaction with 
income inequality, the two main variables of interest, in subsamples split by measures of civil 
liberties and economic opportunities.18 These measures, that arguably proxy for actual social 
                                               
17
 As the explanation to Hypothesis 3 suggests, even past experiences of failed own investments do not 
necessarily lead to an updating of fairness perceptions. 
18
 The complete model also includes the other micro control variables, country fixed effects, and wave and 
cohort effects, with results similar to those reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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mobility, as the Gastil index of civil liberties and the Fraser index of economic freedom. 
Subindices of the full Fraser index cover aspects of government size, legal quality and 
protection of property rights, inflation and the domestic financial market, trade openness and 
access to foreign capital, and labor market regulation and other market rigidities that might 
hamper entrepreneurial activities. In particular, column 1 employs the Gastil index of civil 
liberties, while column 2 reports the results for the Full Fraser index. The remaining columns 
employ subindices of the Fraser index that relate to the five specific areas described above.19 
Supporting the findings of Table 2, in both Tables 6 and 7 there is a positive association 
between perceived fairness and subjective well-being in most of the models. In the focus of 
our analysis are the interaction terms between income inequality and perceived fairness. In 
line with Hypothesis 3, we observe the expected disappointment effect in the low economic 
opportunity sample (Table 6), indicated by the negative (in most cases significant at the ten 
percent level at least) interaction between GINI and the four fairness perception measures. 
Given that the GINI coefficient varies between 20 and 60 in the sample, the overall effect of 
fairness perception remains positive, but is reduced in size as income inequality increases. In 
contrast to our prediction, in high social mobility countries (Table 7) the interaction effects 
with income inequality are heterogeneous rather than unequivocally positive. This finding 
suggests that for some fairness perception measures and measures of economic opportunities, 
the expected positive interaction may be dominated by a different, negative effect, resulting 
either in overall insignificance or even a negative sign on the coefficient. We also note that if 
negative interactions occur, they are smaller in size compared to the corresponding 
interactions in the low-mobility country sample.  
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                                               
19
 For countries with high social mobility (Table 7), there is an insufficient number of observations for the 
subindices areas 1 and 2, so we cannot estimate these models. 
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Even though Hypothesis 3 lets us expect a positive interaction between fairness 
perceptions and income inequality in high mobility countries, the heterogeneous coefficient 
estimates in Table 7 are not necessarily contradicting our theoretical model. In countries with 
high mobility the model also allows for some ambiguity regarding the overall effect of 
inequality and perceived fairness on well-being. Even in countries with a considerably high 
mobility we can expect to have some share of overinvestors in the population, who 
overestimate p . This group is joined by those individuals who have ex ante underestimated, 
or estimated the correct value of p , but who have nevertheless realized ex post that they have 
failed. This group of individuals may turn out to be particularly disgruntled and disappointed 
due to their failed efforts. For them, we do therefore also expect that actual reductions of 
inequality, which compensate them ex post for their ex ante unexpected loss, have a positive 
impact on their reported well-being. We can, however, be certain that the group of individuals 
who are disappointed ex post is smaller in high-mobility countries, relative to the size of the 
same group of individuals in low-mobility countries. Thus, even if the case occurs that ex ante 
over-optimism is strong enough even in a high-mobility country to produce a negative 
interaction between increased fairness and increased actual inequality, the size of the effect 
should be smaller than in a low-mobility country. 
 
 
4.5 Robustness tests using actual social mobility measures 
The model in Tables 6 – 7 and the empirical corroboration of Hypothesis 3 hinges on the 
assumption that social mobility, economic opportunities and economic freedom are 
sufficiently correlated. As additional robustness test, we replicate the analyses using direct 
measures of educational mobility. These direct measures are available for some OECD 
countries only, implying the disadvantage that they substantially reduce the sample size.  
Table 8 estimates the same model as in Tables 6 and 7 for two country samples split 
by the degree of intergenerational educational mobility. We employ our measure of actual 
educational mobility, defined as the educational advantage enjoyed by a person from a high-
education family (maternal or paternal education), which is available for a maximum of 27 
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OECD countries in our baseline sample. The sample is split at -22 and -27 test score points, 
respectively. Again, we report only those regression results for which at least 10 countries 
remain in each of the subsamples, resulting in two fairness perception measures (‘laziness’ 
and ‘conservative’). Columns 1 and 2 present the low educational mobility findings, 
differentiated by either paternal or maternal family background (correlation coefficient: rho = 
0.94); columns 3 and 4 display analogous regressions for countries with a high degree of 
social mobility.  
For all fairness perception measures, the disappointment effect is observable in low 
mobility countries. Equally in line with Hypothesis 3, in the high mobility country sample we 
observe positive interactions of inequality for mother’s educational background, but an 
insignificant interplay for paternal education level. The latter result corresponds with the 
finding obtained for measures of economic freedom and is equally in line with our theoretical 
model. Again, we achieve corroborating results for those fairness perception measures that are 
similar to those employed in previous empirical studies discussed above (e.g., Corneo and 
Gruener, 2002, Alesina and LaFerrara, 2005).  
Overall, the robustness test using educational mobility measures in Table 8 is well in 
line with Hypothesis 3, with a negative interaction in low mobility countries, and 
heterogeneous effects in the high mobility country sample.20  
 
 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------------------------ 
 
                                               
20
 In our view, it is not a coincidence that the process of industrialization and period of high growth in Europe 
and the USA (from 1790 on) was preceded by political reforms which abolished the competition-hindering and 
incentive-incompatible medieval guild system, which fixed production technology, prices for goods and wages 
for employees, and choice of profession. It is for this reason that we view GDP growth as a potential alternative 
measure of actual social mobility (correlation (GDP growth, social mobility): 0.4), in line with Hirschman and 
Rothschild (1973) who argue that in times of rapid economic growth income inequality is interpreted as higher 
opportunities. Regressions for country sample split by economic growth yield qualitatively identical findings 
compared to when more direct measures of social mobility are employed (see Appendix Table A3).   
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To summarize, the empirical analysis clearly is in line with our theoretical hypotheses. 
Individuals who perceive their society as unfair are less likely to be satisfied with their lives 
(Hypothesis 1), and are more likely to oppose redistributive government activities (Hypothesis 
2). In low mobility countries, people fare the better, the more redistribution takes place, 
reflected in reduced income inequality. This effect is enlarged by lower mobility perceptions: 
the positive effect of living in a fair society on well-being decreases as income inequality 
rises. In contrast, in high mobility countries, we observe that – given that the disappointment 
through failed investments is not too large – people are more ready to bear existing income 
inequalities and disfavor redistribution. Perceiving the income generation process as fair 
creates an increase in well-being that is rising with income inequality (Hypothesis 3). As these 
findings provide an important qualification to standard assumptions in welfare economics, we 
proceed to discuss them in the concluding section. 
 
 
5. Conclusions   
The empirical literature on the relation between income inequality and happiness has yielded 
ambiguous results. The starting point of this paper was that one of the potential reasons for 
this confusion might be that people evaluate the fairness of the income distribution 
(distribution process) differently and that such subjective evaluations eventually affect their 
subjective well-being. Extending the previous literature, we also make the case that inequality 
assessments hinge on whether social mobility expectations meet actual societal mobility or 
not. 
We illustrate the relationship between inequality and subjective well-being in a small 
formal model. We assume that individual investments in human capital depend on 
subjectively perceived probabilities of success that, in turn, reflect fairness perceptions: The 
higher the probability of success, the closer is the individually perceived connection between 
individual investment and economic outcomes. We therefore in general expect a positive 
relationship between perceived fairness and overall well-being, and a negative effect on 
preference for government redistribution. If ex ante fairness perceptions are sufficiently low, 
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the individual will choose an investment level of zero, and benefit from a reduction of income 
inequality through taxes and transfers. We also distinguish between systematic over- and 
underestimation of the actual fairness of the income generating process. Actual fairness is 
associated with low and high upwards mobility, respectively. We argue that in low mobility 
countries, actual returns on investment are lower than expected ones, so that increased 
perceived ex ante fairness will lead to reduced well-being due to a disappointment effect, that 
increases as less income redistribution takes place. In contrast, in high mobility countries, the 
model predicts a positive interaction of fairness with inequality, because here, a perception of 
the income generating process as more fair will lead to both higher inequality, but also more 
favorable economic outcomes on average.   
We test this model using combined individual-level data of the pooled third and fourth 
waves of the World Values Survey (1994-2001), containing about 150’000 interviewed 
individuals in 69 countries. According to the results, the respondents’ believe that income 
inequality in society is the result of a comparably fair market process makes them 
considerably more satisfied with their lives, while a demand for more government 
redistribution to correct the achieved income distribution is negatively associated with 
happiness. However, differentiating by level of actual social mobility in a country, in 
countries with fewer economic opportunities we find indirect evidence for a disappointment 
effect through failed investments, reflected in a negative interplay between income inequality 
and fairness perceptions, which rises in both fairness perceptions and income inequality, 
reflecting lesser income-corrective government activities. In contrast, in countries with plenty 
of economic opportunities and equal chances to success, strong beliefs in fairness interact 
positively with actual income inequality. Indeed, this finding confirms our theoretical model 
which predicts that in these countries with high social mobility higher perceived fairness 
makes individuals invest more and come closer to the point of optimal investment, thus 
yielding a higher return on investment that would be lowered if government would 
redistribute market incomes. This positive interaction appears stronger when a measure of 
actual social and intergenerational mobility in terms of educational attainment is applied 
rather than when cruder measures of economic freedom are used.  
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The findings rather clearly reject the standard Lerner argument that more 
redistribution and less income inequality leads to an increase in welfare of the average person, 
and thus, in average welfare. Instead, the model and the empirical analysis suggest that for 
broad groups of countries the potential effects of inequality are either neutralized or enlarged 
through individual fairness perceptions and evaluations, thus making the effect of inequality 
ambiguous at the aggregate level of society, although, in reality not necessarily for the core 
constituency of specific governments that actually implement redistribution. As such, our 
findings may hold implications for both policy and future theorizing on the subject. 
Obviously, in terms of happiness there may be a substitutive effect between developing 
institutions permitting fair market competition and social mobility, on the one hand, and 
redistributive government activities, on the other: the latter are only essential if actual social 
mobility is low but fairness perceptions are high. As human beings tend to be overly 
optimistic in general, it would seem to be beneficial to overall welfare to implement policies 
and institutions that foster competition and allow for equal opportunities and economic 
freedom. This finding is quite in line with the definition of a just society often brought 
forward by politically conservative persons, but also be congruent with Hayek’s view of a just 
world. Overall, our results suggest that creating a society with such equal opportunities would 
be preferred over a paternalistic and overly redistributive state.  
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Table 1: Measures of fairness perceptions and income redistribution 
Variable name Definition 
Fairness in the education system and the labor market 
Hard work Dummy that is ‘one’ for values below 5 on the 
question ‘In the long run, hard work usually brings 
success’ (which has a 10-point scale) 
Laziness  Dummy that is ‘one’ for individuals claiming ‘People 
are living in need because of laziness or lack of 
willpower’ and ‘zero’ when answering ‘People are 
living in need because of injustice in society’ 
Chance Dummy that is ‘one’ for individuals claiming that 
‘people have a chance to escape poverty’. 
(alternative: ‘they have little chance’) 
 
General meritocratic worldview  
Conservative Dummy that is ‘one’ for values above or equal to 7 
on a 10-point scale measuring conservative political 
ideology 
  
Demand for income redistribution 
More equal  
incomes 
Dummy that is ‘one’ for values below 5 on the 
question “Incomes should be more equal” (which has 
a 10-point scale) 
Elimination Dummy that is ‘one’ for values 1 and 2 on a 5-point 
scale measuring the ‘importance of eliminating big 
income inequalities’ (ranging from ‘very important’ 
to ‘not at all important’). 
Basic needs Dummy that is ‘one’ for values 1 and 2 on a 5-point 
scale measuring the ‘importance to guaranteeing 
basic needs’ (ranging from ‘very important’ to ‘not at 
all important’). 
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Table 2: Relations between happiness and fairness perceptions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Hard work brings success in the long run 0.224***    
number of observations 60730    
     
People are poor due to laziness   0.570***   
number of observations  62920   
     
People have chance to escape poverty   0.483***  
number of observations   59383  
     
Conservative ideology    0.411*** 
number of observations    146752 
     
Income, education, occupational status no no no no 
Other micro controls included yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects included yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Income, education and 
occupational status are excluded from the model. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: Relations between happiness and fairness perceptions – testing the transmission 
channels 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
hard work brings success in the long run 0.212***    
number of observations 60730    
     
people are poor due to laziness  0.501***   
number of observations  62920   
     
people have chance to escape poverty   0.433***  
number of observations   59383  
     
conservative ideology    0.363*** 
number of observations    146752 
     
Income, education, occupational status yes yes yes yes 
Baseline micro controls included yes yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects included yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Income, education and 
occupational status are included. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Fairness perceptions and the demand for income redistribution  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Incomes 
should be 
more equal 
importance 
to eliminate 
income 
inequality 
importance of 
guaranteeing 
basic needs 
hard work brings success in the long run 0.097***   
 [8.44]   
marginal effect 0.035   
number of observations 59325   
Pseudo R2 0.0521 
   
people are poor due to laziness, not injustice 
-0.230*** -0.311*** -0.249*** 
 [20.79] [18.83] [10.92] 
marginal effect 
-0.082 -0.110 -0.034 
number of observations 74588 28814 29114 
Pseudo R2 0.0574 
 
0.0792 
 
0.063 
 
people have chance to escape poverty 
-0.147***   
 [11.95]   
marginal effect 
-0.052   
number of observations 57822   
Pseudo R2 0.0505 
   
conservative ideology 
-0.217*** -0.360*** -0.224*** 
 [23.68] [19.69] [9.43] 
marginal effect 
-0.075 -0.134 -0.034 
number of observations 128917 34193 34610 
Pseudo R2 0.07 
 
0.0847 
 
0.0633 
 
    
Country fixed effects included yes yes yes 
Income, education, occupational status no no no 
Baseline micro controls included yes yes yes 
 
Notes: Probit estimations. Dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of preference for income redistribution. 
All models include other micro controls such as gender, age, family type, marital status, religion, religiosity, 
spirituality, cohort effects, country fixed effects and a wave dummy. Excluded from the model are measures of 
education, income, and occupational status. Missing regressions are due to insufficient sample sizes. *, **, *** 
denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Subjective well-being and the demand for redistribution 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Importance to eliminate income inequality -0.338***   
 [6.40]   
Incomes should be more equal  -0.380***  
  [26.86]  
Importance to guaranteeing basic needs   -0.177*** 
   [4.19] 
    
baseline micro controls included yes yes yes 
income, education, occupational status no no no 
country fixed effects included yes yes yes 
    
number of observations 34193 128917 34610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.22 0.24 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Analysis by low social mobility through little economic opportunities  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Civil liberties  
low 
Fraser  
full index  
< 6.3 
government  
size  
large 
legal  
quality  
low 
inflation  
high 
openness  
low 
new  
business  
difficult 
   area 1 area 2 area 3 area 4 area 5 
        
Hard work * GINI -0.001 -0.005** -0.007 -0.002 -0.004* -0.004 -0.003 
 [0.33] [2.03] [0.88] [0.70] [1.73] [1.46] [0.79] 
Hardwork 0.221* 0.424*** 0.493** 0.290*** 0.403*** 0.361*** 0.348*** 
 [1.72] [4.26] [2.18] [2.61] [4.26] [3.49] [2.98] 
Observations 28613 28037 20722 29630 33111 27768 22566 
        
Chance * GINI -0.004 -0.016*** 0.015* -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** 
 [1.44] [7.13] [1.77] [6.66] [6.83] [6.23] [4.71] 
Chance 0.718*** 1.114*** 0.142 1.144*** 1.090*** 1.025*** 1.013*** 
 [5.73] [11.61] [0.56] [10.27] [11.58] [9.97] [9.14] 
Observations 30488 29914 20127 30373 34941 28540 23551 
        
Laziness * GINI -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007 -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.015*** 
 [2.91] [3.36] [1.08] [5.29] [4.01] [3.26] [5.46] 
Laziness 0.938*** 0.900*** 0.683*** 1.085*** 0.968*** 0.839*** 1.075*** 
 [7.57] [9.66] [3.51] [10.80] [10.37] [8.78] [10.94] 
Observations 35191 35810 36686 38145 37779 35407 36027 
        
Conservative * GINI -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.016*** 
 [2.99] [4.77] [2.87] [4.75] [4.98] [5.04] [7.45] 
Conservative 0.732*** 0.871*** 0.792*** 0.867*** 0.911*** 0.840*** 1.033*** 
 [6.83] [10.15] [6.12] [9.55] [10.01] [9.94] [12.09] 
Observations 67018 62055 47160 73857 57237 70405 65921 
        
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the models are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Analysis by high social mobility through good economic opportunities  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Civil liberties  
high 
Fraser  
full index  
> 6.2 
inflation  
low 
openness  
high 
new business  
easy 
   area 3 area 4 area 5 
      
Hard work * GINI -0.005** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.005* 
 [2.03] [0.21] [0.33] [0.17] [1.74] 
Hardwork 0.438*** 0.253** 0.22 0.315*** 0.436*** 
 [4.98] [1.98] [1.57] [2.60] [3.82] 
Observations 31355 21319 16245 21588 26790 
      
Chance * GINI -0.013*** 0.007** 0.005 0 -0.006** 
 [5.78] [2.03] [1.15] [0.07] [2.10] 
Chance 0.929*** 0.097 0.165 0.486*** 0.620*** 
 [9.77] [0.64] [1.00] [3.60] [4.90] 
Observations 28161 18535 13508 19909 24898 
      
Laziness * GINI -0.002 -0.002 -0.007** -0.004 0.011*** 
 [0.80] [0.71] [2.38] [1.24] [4.84] 
Laziness 0.508*** 0.407*** 0.573*** 0.515*** -0.03 
 [7.04] [4.37] [5.54] [5.31] [0.34] 
Observations 49436 38220 36251 38623 38003 
      
Conservative * GINI -0.004** -0.004* -0.004** -0.002 0.004** 
 [2.32] [1.86] [2.12] [0.87] [2.00] 
Conservative 0.527*** 0.454*** 0.468*** 0.440*** 0.218*** 
 [8.20] [5.84] [6.13] [5.21] [2.82] 
Observations 78967 68787 73605 60437 64921 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. For area 1 and 2, the number of observations was too low.  
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Table 8: Educational mobility, fairness perceptions and income inequality 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Low mobility Low mobility High mobility High mobility 
 father mother father mother 
Laziness  1.084*** 1.131*** 0.024 0.001 
 [7.72] [7.73] [0.14] [0.01] 
Laziness * GINI -0.022*** -0.023*** 0.007 0.008* 
 [5.15] [5.21] [1.49] [1.75] 
Number of observations 22903 19951 13248 16200 
Number of countries 14 13 10 11 
     
Conservative  0.734*** 0.833*** 0.083 0.008 
 [5.58] [6.08] [0.61] [0.07] 
Conservative * GINI -0.009** -0.011*** 0.004 0.006* 
 [2.37] [2.89] [1.12] [1.73] 
Number of observations 34835 30812 20180 24203 
Number of countries 14 13 12 13 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include 
the baseline micro-variables, wave, cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are 
measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level, respectively. 
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Appendix A: Full results 
Table A1: baseline model; fairness perceptions and life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
age -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.139*** 
 [9.03] [5.88] [6.81] [5.84] [8.90] 
age^2/100 0.251*** 0.246*** 0.236*** 0.242*** 0.246*** 
 [7.48] [4.69] [5.43] [4.56] [7.33] 
age^3/1000 -0.133*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.120*** -0.130*** 
 [6.20] [3.59] [4.42] [3.52] [6.08] 
male -0.044*** 0.003 0.004 -0.01 -0.063*** 
 [3.11] [0.15] [0.20] [0.46] [4.46] 
buddhist 0.185** 0.538*** 0.375*** 0.510*** 0.164** 
 [2.53] [4.87] [3.31] [4.45] [2.25] 
muslim -0.126** 0.054 -0.201*** 0.063 -0.123** 
 [2.43] [0.67] [2.72] [0.76] [2.37] 
catholic 0.011 0.183*** -0.007 0.183*** 0.003 
 [0.26] [2.87] [0.13] [2.85] [0.08] 
protestant 0.170*** 0.312*** 0.117** 0.318*** 0.159*** 
 [3.81] [4.76] [2.09] [4.77] [3.56] 
orthodox -0.335*** -0.212*** -0.381*** -0.205*** -0.315*** 
 [6.47] [2.84] [6.04] [2.72] [6.10] 
other Christian denomination -0.049 0.550*** 0.234** 0.534*** -0.05 
 [0.70] [4.50] [2.41] [4.46] [0.71] 
no denomination -0.001 0.171*** 0.005 0.189*** 0.002 
 [0.03] [2.62] [0.09] [2.87] [0.03] 
jewish -0.077 0.146 0.002 0.153 -0.058 
 [0.61] [0.80] [0.01] [0.83] [0.47] 
hindu 0.249*** 0.481*** 0.288*** 0.498*** 0.248*** 
 [3.39] [4.33] [2.65] [4.40] [3.39] 
single female 0.194*** 0.178*** 0.220*** 0.162*** 0.164*** 
 [6.45] [3.68] [5.62] [3.34] [5.48] 
single male 0.184*** 0.202*** 0.167*** 0.199*** 0.153*** 
 [5.92] [3.98] [4.05] [3.93] [4.94] 
married 0.706*** 0.744*** 0.727*** 0.725*** 0.689*** 
 [36.39] [24.56] [30.40] [23.72] [35.56] 
cohabiting 0.300*** 0.322*** 0.325*** 0.364*** 0.274*** 
 [8.81] [6.42] [7.19] [7.38] [8.05] 
has had 1 child -0.147*** -0.127*** -0.081*** -0.131*** -0.163*** 
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 [6.19] [3.53] [2.66] [3.64] [6.90] 
has had 2 children -0.120*** -0.129*** -0.032 -0.117*** -0.135*** 
 [5.19] [3.70] [1.09] [3.32] [5.85] 
has had 3 or more children -0.174*** -0.131*** -0.085*** -0.123*** -0.188*** 
 [7.32] [3.62] [2.75] [3.37] [7.92] 
service part: > once a week 0.479*** 0.519*** 0.507*** 0.478*** 0.447*** 
 [18.34] [12.02] [13.67] [10.96] [17.18] 
service part: once a week 0.282*** 0.315*** 0.300*** 0.269*** 0.249*** 
 [12.30] [8.52] [9.87] [7.26] [10.85] 
service part: one a month 0.185*** 0.227*** 0.247*** 0.167*** 0.164*** 
 [7.44] [5.98] [7.84] [4.41] [6.61] 
service part: on common holy days 0.195*** 0.170*** 0.186*** 0.145*** 0.178*** 
 [8.87] [5.14] [6.74] [4.33] [8.08] 
service part: on specific holy days 0.300*** 0 0.321*** 0 0.291*** 
 [5.94] [.] [5.85] [.] [5.77] 
service part: once a year 0.104*** 0.157*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.092*** 
 [3.96] [4.13] [3.92] [3.29] [3.51] 
service part: less than once a year -0.01 0.001 0.01 -0.033 -0.015 
 [0.39] [0.03] [0.32] [0.91] [0.64] 
believes in superior being 0.044** 0.112*** 0.096*** 0.148*** 0.021 
 [2.36] [3.83] [4.13] [4.95] [1.13] 
hard work brings success in the long run  0.224***    
  [11.65]    
people are poor due to laziness, not injustice   0.501***   
   [29.39]   
people have chance to escape poverty    0.483***  
    [23.69]  
Conservative ideology     0.411*** 
     [27.89] 
Constant 8.126*** 4.226*** 5.030*** 4.432*** 7.959*** 
 [33.52] [11.43] [15.26] [11.91] [32.91] 
Country fixed effects, wave fixed effects, age cohorts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 146752 60730 85343 59383 146752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.23 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. *, **, *** denote 
significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table A2: fairness perceptions, income, education, occupational status and life 
satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Age -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.158*** -0.161*** 
 [6.13] [6.22] [6.40] [10.23] 
Age squared/100 0.263*** 0.262*** 0.274*** 0.291*** 
 [4.98] [5.05] [5.14] [8.62] 
Age to the power of three/1000 -0.127*** -0.134*** -0.136*** -0.153*** 
 [3.75] [4.03] [3.96] [7.14] 
male -0.013 -0.01 -0.016 -0.047*** 
 [0.57] [0.44] [0.69] [3.09] 
buddhist 0.407*** 0.274** 0.380*** 0.072 
 [3.76] [2.36] [3.38] [1.01] 
muslim 0.117 -0.035 0.125 -0.081 
 [1.47] [0.43] [1.55] [1.59] 
catholic 0.061 -0.065 0.076 -0.103** 
 [0.98] [1.02] [1.20] [2.40] 
protestant 0.188*** 0.047 0.205*** 0.043 
 [2.93] [0.71] [3.13] [0.97] 
orthodox -0.272*** -0.431*** -0.262*** -0.371*** 
 [3.73] [5.87] [3.54] [7.33] 
other Christian denomination 0.400*** 0.280** 0.408*** -0.068 
 [3.34] [2.43] [3.46] [1.00] 
no denomination 0.049 -0.052 0.074 -0.105** 
 [0.76] [0.80] [1.14] [2.38] 
jewish -0.093 -0.002 -0.058 -0.266** 
 [0.52] [0.01] [0.32] [2.16] 
hindu 0.402*** 0.282** 0.422*** 0.176** 
 [3.69] [2.50] [3.80] [2.45] 
Income level 1 ref. cat.    
     
Income level 2 0.176*** 0.257*** 0.213*** 0.176*** 
 [4.52] [6.71] [5.43] [6.75] 
Income level 3 0.371*** 0.433*** 0.365*** 0.355*** 
 [9.39] [11.05] [9.06] [13.64] 
Income level 4 0.563*** 0.614*** 0.559*** 0.597*** 
 [13.76] [15.39] [13.65] [22.55] 
Income level 5 0.708*** 0.755*** 0.728*** 0.758*** 
 [16.80] [17.99] [16.85] [27.51] 
Income level 6 0.831*** 0.820*** 0.786*** 0.872*** 
 [18.30] [18.39] [17.23] [29.64] 
Income level 7 0.971*** 0.988*** 0.960*** 1.028*** 
 [20.32] [20.59] [19.62] [32.98] 
Income level 8 1.114*** 1.052*** 1.044*** 1.105*** 
 [21.59] [20.48] [20.10] [32.69] 
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Income level 9 1.206*** 1.188*** 1.176*** 1.173*** 
 [21.30] [20.46] [20.08] [31.17] 
Income level 10 (highest) 1.386*** 1.303*** 1.292*** 1.284*** 
 [23.54] [22.05] [21.97] [32.60] 
no income information 0.692*** 0.698*** 0.660*** 0.762*** 
 [16.40] [16.64] [15.15] [27.75] 
no education /incomplete ref. cat.    
primary education     
completed primary education 0.337*** 0.320*** 0.352*** 0.157*** 
 [8.19] [8.09] [8.45] [6.37] 
incomplete sec., techn. 0.369*** 0.328*** 0.353*** 0.240*** 
 [7.93] [7.22] [7.42] [8.50] 
complete sec., techn. 0.538*** 0.489*** 0.539*** 0.280*** 
 [12.93] [11.86] [12.69] [10.86] 
incomplete sec., uni prep. 0.359*** 0.390*** 0.371*** 0.269*** 
 [7.70] [8.86] [8.04] [9.54] 
complete sec., uni prep. 0.584*** 0.520*** 0.570*** 0.360*** 
 [13.48] [12.44] [13.04] [13.67] 
lower-level tertiary edu. 0.533*** 0.528*** 0.524*** 0.386*** 
 [10.33] [10.45] [10.12] [12.25] 
upper-level tertiary edu. 0.764*** 0.702*** 0.735*** 0.503*** 
 [17.37] [16.27] [16.64] [18.23] 
education missing 0.524*** 0.383*** 0.519*** 0.327*** 
 [4.01] [3.77] [3.92] [5.97] 
divorced or separated ref. cat.    
     
single female 0.059 0.099** 0.06 0.054* 
 [1.23] [2.13] [1.25] [1.81] 
single male 0.115** 0.116** 0.126** 0.044 
 [2.29] [2.38] [2.53] [1.42] 
married 0.535*** 0.541*** 0.533*** 0.465*** 
 [17.69] [18.40] [17.47] [23.99] 
cohabiting 0.252*** 0.309*** 0.323*** 0.192*** 
 [5.11] [6.35] [6.66] [5.73] 
has had no child ref.cat.    
     
has had 1 child -0.093*** -0.091** -0.095*** -0.139*** 
 [2.63] [2.57] [2.67] [5.98] 
has had 2 children -0.093*** -0.031 -0.079** -0.113*** 
 [2.71] [0.91] [2.29] [4.98] 
has had 3 or more children -0.001 0.012 0.01 -0.080*** 
 [0.02] [0.34] [0.28] [3.43] 
employed ref.cat.    
     
self-employed 0.047 0.015 0.038 0.005 
 [1.33] [0.44] [1.08] [0.22] 
housewife 0.079** 0.089*** 0.105*** 0.121*** 
 [2.27] [2.61] [3.00] [5.54] 
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retired -0.091** -0.147*** -0.083** -0.151*** 
 [2.32] [3.85] [2.09] [5.87] 
other 0.009 -0.043 -0.011 -0.119** 
 [0.13] [0.63] [0.15] [2.57] 
student 0.115** 0.094** 0.081* -0.043 
 [2.52] [2.09] [1.76] [1.51] 
unemployed -0.536*** -0.537*** -0.504*** -0.601*** 
 [15.42] [15.85] [14.60] [27.36] 
service part: > once a week 0.509*** 0.480*** 0.479*** 0.448*** 
 [12.01] [11.56] [11.17] [17.52] 
service part: once a week 0.302*** 0.293*** 0.263*** 0.247*** 
 [8.32] [8.29] [7.24] [10.97] 
service part: one a month 0.221*** 0.218*** 0.166*** 0.160*** 
 [5.95] [5.95] [4.44] [6.60] 
service part: on common holy days 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.140*** 0.164*** 
 [4.85] [4.82] [4.26] [7.59] 
service part: on specific holy days . 0.388*** . 0.294*** 
 . [3.56] . [5.93] 
service part: once a year 0.135*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.074*** 
 [3.61] [3.04] [2.95] [2.89] 
service part: less than once a year 0.018 -0.004 -0.020 -0.008 
 [0.51] [0.12] [0.57] [0.33] 
service part: never ref.cat.    
     
believes in superior being 0.164*** 0.191*** 0.193*** 0.063*** 
 [5.71] [6.72] [6.56] [3.41] 
     
hard work brings success in the long 
run 0.212***    
 [11.22]    
people are poor due to laziness  0.501***   
  [23.39]   
people have chance to escape poverty   0.433***  
   [21.59]  
conservative ideology    0.363*** 
    [25.10] 
Constant 3.066*** 3.479*** 3.389*** 7.177*** 
 [8.13] [9.15] [8.92] [29.01] 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Wave dummy, cohort effects yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 60730 62920 59383 146752 
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.26 
 
Notes: The specification of this model is based on Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008). 
 
 52 
 
Table A3: Economic Growth, fairness perceptions and income inequality 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 10-year growth 30-year growth high & stable   10-year growth 30-year growth low or unstable  
 high high 10-year growth  low low 10-year growth 
Hard work 0.464*** 0.201 0.238  0.359*** 0.400*** 0.416*** 
Hard work * GINI -0.005 0.002 0.001  -0.003 -0.005** -0.005** 
Observations 24178 18886 17392  28500 41844 35286 
        
Laziness 0.156 0.423*** 0.386***  0.806*** 0.761*** 0.784*** 
Laziness * GINI 0.007** -0.003 -0.001  -0.008*** -0.004* -0.006*** 
Observations 30277 37003 28895  46091 48340 47473 
        
Chance  0.183 0.480*** 0.472***  1.147*** 1.019*** 1.017*** 
Chance * GINI 0.009** -0.002 -0.001  -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
Observations 22269 21278 15657  29437 38105 36049 
        
Conservative 0.144 0.478*** 0.085  0.787*** 0.752*** 0.861*** 
Conservative * GINI 0.008*** -0.004* 0.008**  -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 
Observations 49700 68328 46378  73649 78424 76971 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. All models include the baseline micro-variables, wave, 
cohort and country effects (not reported). Excluded from the model are measures of education, income, and occupational status. *, **, *** denote 
significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Life satisfaction 150793 6.36 2.59 1 10 
age 150466 41.16 16.19 15 101 
age^2/100 150466 19.56 15.01 2.25 102.01 
age^3/1000 150466 10.44 11.74 0.34 103.03 
male 150793 0.48 0.50 0 1 
buddhist 150793 0.01 0.11 0 1 
muslim 150793 0.15 0.36 0 1 
catholic 150793 0.32 0.47 0 1 
protestant 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
orthodox 150793 0.09 0.28 0 1 
other Christian denomination 150793 0.02 0.14 0 1 
no religious affiliation 150793 0.22 0.41 0 1 
jewish 150793 0.01 0.10 0 1 
hindu 150793 0.02 0.16 0 1 
age category 25-34 150466 0.24 0.42 0 1 
age category 35-44 150466 0.21 0.41 0 1 
age category 45-54 150466 0.16 0.36 0 1 
age category 55-64 150466 0.12 0.32 0 1 
age category > 65 Jahre  150466 0.11 0.31 0 1 
income category 2 150793 0.13 0.33 0 1 
income category 3 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
income category 4 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
income category 5 150793 0.11 0.31 0 1 
income category 6 150793 0.09 0.28 0 1 
income category 7 150793 0.07 0.26 0 1 
income category 8 150793 0.05 0.22 0 1 
income category 9 150793 0.04 0.19 0 1 
income category 10 150793 0.04 0.18 0 1 
income missing 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
completed primary education 150793 0.15 0.36 0 1 
incomplete secondary edu., technical 150793 0.09 0.29 0 1 
complete secondary edu., technical 150793 0.17 0.38 0 1 
incomplete secondary edu., university prep. 150793 0.10 0.29 0 1 
complete secondary edu., university prep. 150793 0.16 0.36 0 1 
lower-level tertiary education 150793 0.07 0.26 0 1 
upper-level tertiary education 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
education missing 150793 0.02 0.15 0 1 
single female 150793 0.11 0.31 0 1 
single male 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
married 150793 0.57 0.50 0 1 
cohabiting 150793 0.05 0.21 0 1 
has had 1 child 150793 0.15 0.36 0 1 
has had 2 children 150793 0.27 0.44 0 1 
has had 3 children 150793 0.27 0.45 0 1 
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Self-employed 150793 0.09 0.28 0 1 
housewife 150793 0.13 0.34 0 1 
retired 150793 0.14 0.35 0 1 
other occupational status 150793 0.02 0.13 0 1 
student 150793 0.07 0.26 0 1 
unemployed 150793 0.09 0.29 0 1 
service part.: > once a week 147044 0.12 0.33 0 1 
service part.: once a week 147044 0.19 0.39 0 1 
service part.: one a month 147044 0.12 0.32 0 1 
service part.: on common holy days 147044 0.16 0.37 0 1 
service part.: on specific holy days 147044 0.02 0.13 0 1 
service part.: once a year 147044 0.08 0.27 0 1 
service part.: less than once a year 147044 0.10 0.29 0 1 
believes in superior being 150793 0.76 0.42 0 1 
hard work brings success in the long run 61716 0.54 0.50 0 1 
people are poor due to laziness, not injustice 86498 0.33 0.47 0 1 
people have chance to escape poverty 60278 0.39 0.49 0 1 
conservative ideology 150793 0.23 0.42 0 1 
GINI 150793 37.77 10.33 21.5 63.43 
civil liberties (Gastil) 150015 3.14 1.42 1 6 
Fraser index of economic freedom 134641 6.33 1.21 3.45 8.65 
area 1 (Fraser) 134641 5.48 1.68 1.8 8.6 
area 2 (Fraser) 134641 6.25 1.91 2.8 9.6 
area 3 (Fraser) 134641 6.90 2.71 0 9.8 
area 4 (Fraser) 134641 7.08 1.22 3.2 9.3 
area 5 (Fraser) 134641 5.91 1.12 3.2 8.8 
educational mobility (maternal) 56024 -24.27 19.19 -57.74 20.14 
educational mobility (paternal) 56024 -29.79 21.51 -63.91 11.26 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics, income inequality and educational mobility 
Country GINI 
educational 
mobility 
educational 
mobility 
  (mother) (father) 
Albania 28.02   
Algeria 45.33   
Argentina 47.6   
Armenia 48.6   
Australia 41.7 -28.88 -35.44 
Austria 30.5 -11.69 -6.6 
Azerbaijan 50.1   
Bangladesh 28.3   
Belarus 30.4   
Belgium 28.5 -31.7 -28.29 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 32.7   
Brazil 59.6   
Bulgaria 24.5   
Canada 27.6 -21.03 -23.05 
Chile 57.9   
Colombia 51.3   
Croatia 33.4   
Czech Republic 26.6 -54.27 -61.98 
Denmark 33.2 -24.94 -40.95 
Dominican Republic 49   
Egypt 38.6   
El Salvador 50.8   
Estonia 37.6   
Finland 26.1 -16.97 -21.09 
France 25.6 -16.5 -19.02 
Georgia 38.9   
Germany 30 -21.28 -29.72 
Greece 35.2 -20.6 -15.9 
Hungary 27.9 -57.74 -63.91 
India 32   
Indonesia 38.29   
Ireland 34.6 -19.18 -23.84 
Italy 32.2 -1.28 3.26 
Japan 35 -28.49 -33.87 
Jordan 47.26   
Latvia 27   
Lithuania 33.6   
Macedonia 28.2   
Mexico 50.3 20.14 11.07 
Moldova 34.4   
Netherlands 29.4 -32.6 -28.56 
New Zealand 40.2 -13.26 -32.25 
Nigeria 41.2   
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Norway 33.3 -27.37 -23.16 
Pakistan 37.8   
Peru 44.9   
Philippines 45   
Poland 33.1 -53.94 -55.1 
Portugal 35.6 -1.7 11.26 
Russia 30.5   
Singapore 39   
Slovak Republic 21.5 -48.59 -62.22 
Slovenia 28.2   
South Africa 62.3   
South Korea 33.6   
Spain 25.9 -25.07 -27.14 
Sweden 32.4 -2.59 -2.48 
Switzerland 33.1 2.41 -8.71 
Taiwan 30.78   
Tanzania 44.7   
Turkey 44.1 -34.85 -50.23 
Uganda 47.38   
Ukraine 25.7   
United Kingdom 32.4   
United States 37.9 -28.86 -34.53 
Uruguay 44.8   
Venezuela 53.8   
Zimbabwe 63.43   
 
Notes: Based on the regression sample in Table 3 with the largest sample possible, adding conservative 
ideology as measure of fairness perceptions.  
 
 
